Export-led
prosperity: That sounds familiar
We must admit to being more than a little bit concerned about some
of the current discussions surrounding WTO trade negotiations that
link reductions in US farm support to obtaining market access concessions.
One argument that troubles us goes like this. “US farmers
have nothing to worry about with a 60—80, you name the number—percent
reduction in the negotiated level of support because much of the
current level of payments can be placed in the green box—considered
to be non-trade distorting—and thus not counted against reduced
farm support levels. A second “don’t worry, be happy”
message is that, with increased access, US farmers will experience
growing export markets that will more than compensate for reduced
support levels.
Let’s begin with the core question for the first argument:
Is it realistic to believe that the green box is a safe haven for
government payments?
A couple of columns ago we reported on a study by the Australian
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE).
ABARE gave six reasons why decoupled payments, that is payments
that are presumably eligible for green box designation, are not
fully decoupled from production. Among the arguments are the income
and wealth affects including land prices which affect the ability
of farmers to produce major crops. For these and other reasons we
have long argued that decoupled payments are not “identity
preserved” once they reach farmers’ bank accounts or
are used to pay for seed and other inputs.
What we deduce from all that is that payments, whether direct, indirect,
decoupled, or coupled, do not address the underlying inability of
agriculture to self-correct on its own in contrast to nearly all
other industries.
ABARE, however, uses the decoupled-is-not-really-decoupled argument
as a spring board to argue for reduced (read elimination of) payments
regardless of their box color. The International Food and Agricultural
Trade Policy Council (IPC) raises a similar green-box theme in a
paper entitled “Should the Green Box Be Modified?”
What seems obvious is that the green box is not a safe haven for
payments. The green box will be the next target.
The core question for the second argument that “increased
market access will eliminate the need for farm programs because
of increased export demand” is: Even if WTO negotiations generated
complete access to grain-trade worldwide, would the US get the lion’s
share or even its traditional export share for major crops?
To us it is far from clear that market access is our major problem.
World exports of major crops have continued to increase over the
last two-and-a-half decades while the volume of US exports have
fallen to 80 percent of their 1979-81 levels.
At the same time our developing country competitors have seen a
three-fold increase in the volume of their exports of 15 major crops.
They have done this even though, over the last two decades, we have
reduced loan rates, instituted Loan Deficiency Payments, eliminated
set-asides, and shifted to “market-oriented” decoupled
payments.
The promises to US farmers were always there—justifying each
of these policy changes—but the increased exports never showed
up.
We must not forget that the increased market access sought by US
negotiators would not be channeled only to US farmers. Farmers in
those same developing countries that have devoured the growth in
worldwide exports of major crops during the last decade will use
any newly increased market access as opportunities to further expand
their export volumes.
Yes, developing countries will likely see profit opportunities to
export high value products like fruits, vegetable, nuts, and flowers.
But that does not necessarily mean they will depend on imports of
grains and seeds from places like the US to feed their population.
It could happen, but recent history is not on our side.
The promises implied by moving payments to the “green box”
and replacing safety nets with market access sound amazingly similar
to the export-prosperity promises that were made at each of the
policy-change junctures during the last two decades.
Daryll E. Ray holds the Blasingame
Chair of Excellence in Agricultural Policy, Institute of Agriculture,
University of Tennessee, and is the Director of UT’s Agricultural
Policy Analysis Center (APAC). (865) 974-7407; Fax: (865) 974-7298;
dray@utk.edu; http://www.agpolicy.org.
Daryll Ray’s column is written with the research and assistance
of Harwood D. Schaffer, Research Associate with APAC.
Reproduction
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